Iraqi government representatives faced leaders of the Awakening
tribal militia movement in Baghdad today to hear their complaints and answer with promises
that they are not being abandoned. In the second such large public meeting meant to
clear the air, sheiks and former officers from the old Iraqi
army lined up at a microphone in the Rasheed Hotel to sound off. Their fighters
aren’t getting paid what they’re owed, they claimed. They will be left
unprotected and vulnerable to Al Qaeda when their forces are moved into the
Iraqi security forces. And, some protested, many in their ranks have been
arrested by government forces or are in hiding.
With American commanders as matchmakers, the
arranged marriage between the Shiite-led Iraqi government and the largely Sunni
Awakening movement is one of the country’s most tenuous and important pairings.
It will take constant tending. American officers, who had encouraged a similar meeting last fall, lined the back of the hotel
ballroom today. The
90,000-strong Awakening militias include many former insurgents who decided to
turn and fight against Al Qaeda and with U.S. forces--who paid them salaries.
The trick is to find enough of them jobs and a future--without dependence on
the departing U.S. forces--to keep them from returning to insurgency. Last year
they were put under the command and pay of an Iraqi government they trust little
and has given mixed messages.
For starters, the Iraqi government continues
to hold in jail about 17 Awakening (also called Sahwa or Sons of Iraq) leaders
and arrested another just last night. U.S. Maj. Gen. J.D. Johnson, overseeing
the program, says that’s out of a total of about 800 leaders. But each arrest
casts a chill over the other leadership. The fear is that government forces are
settling scores or view the militia commanders as rivals. The government says
some of them have committed crimes, abusing their positions. Some have. But some
have also been released after U.S. officers investigated and found the charges
to be bogus. “Once we know about [an arrest], we start tracking it very
closely,” Johnson said. His answer appeared to acknowledge
another complication: Sometimes the Iraqis are making the arrests without U.S.
knowledge.
There’s also a multitude of problems with
the cumbersome management of the diverse local groups. It’s rarely clear if
salaries are delayed by government opposition or simply problems in reconciling
the many lists of fighters with payrolls. It almost doesn’t matter in the end.
“The slightest bureaucratic error becomes interpreted as something greater than that,”
Johnson said.
While Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki
has repeatedly promised to integrate the fighters into the government, their
presence angers members of his own Shiite constituency who worry about coddling
former Baathists or insurgents. About 13,000 have been brought into the Iraqi
security forces so far, a slow pace endangered anew by a government budget
crunch.
Some Awakening leaders see the end of their
influence coming as their men fold into the government. Whether they were in it
for the money, the power or out of patriotic duty, these tribal leaders and
neighborhood elders are the ones who encouraged their followers to switch sides.
The decision came with risks. “They should support us. We are targeted by Al Qaeda , by IED’s, by snipers,” pleaded Gen. Abdel Razaq, an avuncular, retired
commander who leads a group of fighters in western Baghdad. “We support the
government.”