By Lennox Samuels
After years of war and insurgency, Iraqis have become almost inured to carnage. But incidents such as the suicide truck bombing that killed 80 residents near Kirkuk on Saturday have alarmed even some jaded citizens. The reasons: the disputed northern city of Kirkuk remains a major flashpoint in Iraq's political future, and the assault comes just days before U.S. combat troops are scheduled to permanently leave the country's cities and towns.
The stunning attack in Taza refocuses the spotlight on the nation's underlying sectarian tensions and exposes lingering anxieties about what will happen once the Americans withdraw on June 30, and whether the Iraqi Security Forces can adequately replace them.
Taza's residents are mostly Turkmen, but it lies just south of Kirkuk, where Kurds and Arabs continue to jostle for control. The attack has left Arabs pointing fingers at Kurds, Kurds blaming Arab insurgents, the Baghdad government accusing Al Qaeda, and Shiite and Sunni Arabs eyeing each other with suspicion.
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, U.S. Ambassador Christopher R. Hill and the top American commander, Gen. Ray Odierno, all condemned the bombing, which injured an additional 200 people, vowing that it would derail neither political reconciliation nor the withdrawal steps laid out in the security agreement that Iraq and the U.S. signed last November. But the statements have not quelled the unease, suspicion and paranoia of Iraq's various sects and ethnic groups. No one has claimed responsibility for the latest "significant act," but there are suspects aplenty.
"I think the big explosion in Kirkuk was committed by the Kurdish authorities to show that Kirkuk needs to be under their control to be safe," Baghdad college student Ali Saad told NEWSWEEK.
"People in Kurdistan, including some top officials, are telling me this was the work of either Al Qaeda or the secret services of neighboring states trying to foster Arab nationalism and a renewed civil war," said Asos Kurdi, a veteran journalist in the city of Sulaimaniya.
"This is likely the work of Sunnis who don't want the Americans to leave because they are afraid they will lose even more power, as well as the money the Americans pay them," declared a Shia resident of Baghdad's Karrada district, who asked for anonymity for fear of reprisal.
Such sentiments underscore the challenge Baghdad faces as the Americans draw down and eventually leave altogether by the end of 2011. The government has been adamant that there will be no adjustment in the security agreement. Government leaders have taken every opportunity to emphasize that the country's security forces are ready to take over. Some American commanders initially suggested it might be wise to keep some combat troops in some especially problematic cities, notably Kirkuk and the northern city of Mosul, but the Iraqis were not interested.
"All U.S. [combat] troops will be out no later than the 30th of June," government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said at a press conference last week, adding that that date "will be written in Iraqi history books." At the same briefing, Gen. Odierno, who previously had acknowledged reservations about leaving a half-dozen specific areas, including Mosul, stated stiffly that a joint security assessment with the Iraqis had resulted in the conclusion "that combat forces would withdraw and that trainees and advisers would remain as appropriate." He added that "I feel more comfortable now about where we are." Al-Dabbagh said a solution would be found in Kirkuk that would "avoid any further problems in the city."
The government's eagerness to get the Americans out is not shared by all Iraqis. An unexpected dynamic in the country has been the shifting attitudes of many Shiites and Sunnis. Ascendant during the Saddam regime, many Sunnis initially rebelled against the American "liberators," joining the insurgency alongside Al Qaeda, which paid them to plant IEDS, blow up cars and commit suicide bombings. The Shia, meanwhile, welcomed U.S. troops, which restored to them the power they believed was rightfully theirs by dint of their majority status. Nowadays, however, many Sunnis see a continuing U.S. presence as needed to guarantee their minority rights, and some Shia want the occupiers out of their way to better enjoy complete control.
For many ordinary Iraqis, the government's insistence that the Iraqi Security Forces can maintain law, order and security is a hollow promise, if not dangerous. The ISF—essentially the army and national police—is widely seen as having a huge learning curve. The police, in particular, may not be quite ready for serious paramilitary duties, notwithstanding many months of NATO-sponsored training by Italy's Carabinieri branch of the armed forces. And concerns persist about whether the worldwide economic crisis, which has also hit Iraq, will affect the government's ability to properly arm and equip the army.
Defense Minister Abdul Qadir al-Ubaydi calls government allocations "acceptable," saying the department has achieved its goals. And Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani, while conceding that terrorism, organized crime and recalcitrant militias remain concerns, insists that "the Iraqi Security Forces have the capability to face these challenges."
And so the U.S. departure from urban areas continues. Multinational forces that once numbered 160,000 are down to 130,000, overwhelmingly American troops. More than 140 bases have been closed or turned over to the Iraqis. By the end of this month, the U.S. will have 320 bases in Iraq, a drop from the current 460. And Odierno says, "We will hand over all detainees in a safe and secure fashion." Some of the approximately 13,000 detainees will remain in U.S. custody after June 30, but all will be released or handed over by the end of the year.
No one, however, expects attacks such as Saturday's deadly bombing to end anytime soon. Maliki himself warned that opportunists will continue to take advantage of the American withdrawal from cities to try to destabilize the nation. Many ordinary Iraqis agree, some revealing a marked cynicism about national politics. "With the U.S. withdrawal, everybody will try to assume power," says Fatima Azeez, a primary-school teacher. "There are the Baathists, there is Qaeda, the Badr Brigade, Dawa [Maliki's party], other organizations and parties, who all have weapons."
Hashim al-Taie, a member of parliament from the Sunni Tawafuq bloc, has called for the questioning of the defense and interior ministers as well as the armed forces commander to find out why security violations persist. He also thinks the Americans should help "raise the level of performance for Iraqi forces." But with Iraq's top-line leaders hustling the Americans out, there doesn't seem to be much appetite—or time—for that.
