On Saturday, the DNC's Rules and Bylaws Committee will meet in our nation's capital to resolve the dispute over Florida and Michigan, the two states stripped of their delegates for defying the party and holding primaries before Feb. 5. To get you up to speed on the "Florigan" debacle, we've put together a two-part series of "Frequently Asked Questions." Part I recapped what's already happened; below, we explore what's next.

When will the Florigan flap finally end? 
Saturday in D.C. Or if not, at the Democratic Convention--in late August. 

Why the uncertainty? Well, the Rules and Bylaws Committee must weigh at least three competing agendas from three conflicting corners when it meets this weekend at Washington's Marriott Wardman Park Hotel. First up is Hillary Clinton, who, according to aides, wants two things: a) full delegations seated from each state and b) the delegates apportioned according to the precise popular vote--meaning that Clinton would get 73 delegates from Michigan and Obama, whose name wasn't on the ballot, would get (drumroll, please) zero. Outside, she'll have Reps. Stephanie Tubbs Jones and Corrine Brown leading the protest to "count every vote"--except, of course, Obama's.

Understandably, the Obama camp isn't biting. Their stance? Let's meet halfway: punish these scofflaw states (somehow) for breaking the rules, give Clinton whatever she wants in Florida and split Michigan 50-50. "We don't think it's fair to seat them fully because we both lived by these rules and pledged to abide by them," campaign manager David Plouffe has said. "We're willing to give some delegates here, which I don't think should be sneezed at."

The final player: the Rules Committee itself--which, in the end, is the only player that matters. Charged with maintaining law and order, the RBC is unlikely to let Florida and Michigan off the hook--a decision that would set a bad precedent for other states hoping to leapfrog ahead of Iowa and New Hampshire on the primary calendar. Accordingly, RBC members "have expressed little interest in the option of seating all the delegates" and instead seem inclined to follow the recommendation of DNC lawyers who say that the appropriate legal resolution--"as far as it legally can go"--would be either a) to allow half the number of delegates from each state into the convention, or b) to let the full delegations attend with half a vote each. And they're definitely going to give Obama a few delegates from the Great Lakes State.

Which means that, when all is said and done, Clinton will likely emerge from Florida with a net gain of six delegates (option a) or 19 delegates (option b), and will either split Michigan's 128 delegates with Obama 64-64 (the Obama solution), 69-59 (a compromise proposed by the Michigan Democratic party) or 73-55 (which is what the candidates would've received if every "uncommitted" vote was awarded to Obama).

Confused yet? Don't worry--it gets worse. If Clinton isn't happy with these compromises--which Obama, the RBC, the DNC and both the Michigan and Florida state parties have already signaled that they will accept--her final option is griping to the DNC's Credentials Committee, which meets later this summer and is the only body with the power to seat full delegations from the two rogue states. But according to DNC lawyers, such an appeal "would mean [that] a final decision would not be made until the first day of the convention in Denver, since Credentials Committee decisions have to be approved by the full convention as it convenes - risking a floor fight."

In other words, are you ready to rumble? 

Hold on. Will the RBC's decision, whatever it is, even affect the outcome of the Democratic nominating contest?
Not a chance. Right now, Obama has 1982 total delegates; Clinton has 1783. Even if Clinton gets everything she wants--including a big, fat zero for Obama in Michigan, which won't happen--her largest potential net gain is 111 delegates, which still leaves her 88 delegates shy of her rival from Illinois and a whopping 249 short of a majority. Meanwhile, the likelier scenarios show the former First Lady closing the gap by a mere 19 to 37 delegates. After next Tuesday's final primaries in South Dakota and Montana, both Obama and Clinton will need some superdelegate support to put them over the top. (The old magic number--2,025--will probably break 2,100 once Florida and Michigan are factored in.) But while Obama will require between two and 30 superdels to clinch the nomination (assuming he loses Puerto Rico and wins South Dakota and Montana) Clinton will need more than 170--or roughly 90 percent of the remaining pool. That's a "snowball in Hell" situation.

So what's the point?
You tell me.

I mean, will Clinton actually continue until the convention?
Probably not--but it's possible. In the last 24 hours, Clinton has ratcheted up a pair of arguments that she's been making to the superdelegates for months--namely, that she leads in the "popular vote" and is more electable than Obama. Both claims are controversial: Clinton outperforms Obama in key swing states largely because sizable blocs of her supporters say they won't vote for her rival in the fall, and she only leads in the popular vote if you consider the Pyongyangian score of 330,000 to 0 a fair outcome in Michigan. That said, the Clinton camp sent superdels an 11-page "closing argument" memo Wednesday that repeated both claims along with a slew of new ones: that Clinton has won more delegates than Obama in primaries (as opposed to caucuses); that Clinton has won 16 of the 20 toughest districts for House Democrats; that Clinton has won 350 more counties than Obama; and that Clinton leads 62 percent to 36 percent among those who've voted since March 4. Fair enough. The problem? Primary delegates, tough districts, county tallies and post-March 4 voting patterns don't determine the Democratic nomination at this point. Superdelegates do--and she'll need nearly every undeclared one side with her. But if a mere handful of these party poobahs decide instead after South Dakota and Montana that Obama's 200-delegate lead is more compelling than Clinton's popular-vote and electability counterarguments--since May 6, they've broken for him something like 20-to-1--the Illinois senator will likely amass a delegate majority and lock up the nomination before breakfast on June 4. Both Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi have been contacting "uncommitted superdelegates, encouraging them to prepare to go public and resolve any last question about the contest." "By this time next week, it will all be over, give or take a day," says Reid.

If for some reason it's not, expect Clinton to continue campaigning until it is. Today, the campaign asked reporters to sign up for travel through June 6; "there are a lot of places for us to go between June 4 and November," said spokesman Jay Carson. And there's a tiny chance Clinton could keep on keeping on even if Obama reaches the magic number. Describing the Florigan flap last week in the Sunshine State, the former first lady "invoked the Declaration of Independence, 'the consent of the governed,' the abolition of slavery, 'our most fundamental values,' the 1848 Seneca Falls women's-suffrage convention, the sacrifice of soldiers, the tear gas at Selma, 'equal justice under the law,' and the Voting Rights Act." In the short-term, her melodramatic language was meant to pressure the RBC to seat full delegations. But it also laid the groundwork for a "moral campaign" that extends past June 3--provided the RBC settles (which it will) on anything short of "counting every vote."(Nevermind that every vote was, in fact, counted--or that it's the process of translating those ballots into delegates that's causing our current nightmare.) This is about right and wrong, Clinton could say. And I won't stop until the DNC does the right thing. Or, you know, until lightning strikes Obama--and she steps in to save the day. At this point, Clinton, already the loser, would have to decide whether the damage she's doing the Democratic party (and, in some circles, her own reputation) is worth whatever she has to gain in her new role--desperate understudy masquerading as voting-rights activist, waiting for the star of the show to stumble. My hunch: she already realizes that it's far better for her career to bow out gracefully than embark on a hopeless, scorched-earth crusade, and will exit as soon as Obama gets the nod.

But you never know.

Sure, Puerto Rico, South Dakota and Montana may be the only primaries left on the Democratic nominating calendar. But none of them have the privilege of hosting the party's last, most important battle. That honor goes instead to Washington, D.C. On Saturday, the DNC's Rules and Bylaws Committee will meet in our nation's capital to resolve the dispute over Florida and Michigan, the two states stripped of their delegates for defying the party and scheduling primaries before Feb. 5. To get you up to speed on the "Florigan" debacle-don't blame us for the lingo; that's what the cable newsniks are calling it--we've put together a two-part series of "Frequently Asked Questions." Below is a recap of what's already happened; Part II will explore what's next. Let the games begin.

How did the Democrats get into this mess?
Pick your musical metaphor: "The Long and Winding Road." "Incredible Journey." Even "Off We Go, Into The Wild Blue Yonder." All of them apply. So instead of boring you to tears--or bloodshed--with every mind-numbing twist and turn, we'll go short 'n' sweet.

Michigan has been pushing to break Iowa and New Hampshire's early-primary stranglehold since at least Jan. 19, 2002. That's the date when Democratic Sen. Carl Levin pleaded with the DNC to open up the schedule--and was unanimously voted down. In March 2003, the Great Lakes State explored moving up its contest to coincide with New Hampshire's, but soon decided against it. Fast forward to Jan. 27. 2007, when a bill seeking reschedule Michigan's primary for January 2008--in direct violation of DNC rules, which said that only Iowa, N.H., S.C. and Nevada could hold their contests before Feb. 5--cropped up in the Michigan legislature; seven months later, on Sept. 4, 2007, the state's Democratic legislature and governor officially shifted the primary to Jan. 15, 2008, leapfrogging ahead of New Hampshire. And that was that.

Meanwhile, Florida was making a mess of its own. Legislation designed to push its primary from the first Tuesday of March to Jan. 29, 2008 first appeared in the state House and Senate on Jan. 23, 2007; it passed the legislature (near-unanimously) fourth months later. In both cases, the DNC worked with local officials to choose alternate dates and clearly warned that it would strip the two scofflaw states of 100 percent of their pledged delegates if their contests were held before Feb. 5; as a final precaution, the national party even gave the Great Lakes and Sunshine States 30 days to reschedule. But Democrats in Florida and Michigan rolled the dice pushed for early primaries regardless. They came up empty handed.

In the end, Clinton won both contests — after all the candidates agreed not to campaign in either state and Obama wasn't on the Michigan ballot.

Wait a second. Didn't Republicans have something to do with scheduling the Florida's primary for Jan. 29?
Absolutely. In Florida, the state legislature determined the date of the primary--and unlike Michigan, Florida's legislature is in Republican hands. Determined to play a part in the nominating process, the Sunshine State GOP lawmakers pushed vigorously for an early contest, and their Democratic counterparts had little choice but to go along. Not only did the Dems lack the numbers to block the bill, but voting against it would mean voting against Republican Gov. Charlie Crist's attached proposal to replace touch-screen voting machines with paper ballots--a politically risky proposition.

That said, the Democrats were hardly held hostage. In Florida last week, Hillary Clinton told local Dems that they "didn't break a single rule" and that the decision to vote on Jan. 29 was "beyond [their] control." That's not entirely true. For starters, it was a Democrat--State Sen. Jeremy Ring--who first introduced legislation to reschedule the primary for Jan. 29. "One thing you can be sure of," he said at the time, "is that Florida will be relevant during the primaries.” In fact, Ring even campaigned in 2006 on the need for an early primary--and doesn't apologize for leading the effort. (“I hear that a lot, that I was duped by the Republicans," he has said. "No one duped me.”) What's more, not a single Democratic member of the state House voted against the measure, and there was little opposition in the Senate. Even after it passed, the DNC gave the state party numerous opportunities to create a contest that would comply with the rules--including a caucus on Feb. 5. Florida Democrats said no. Finally, on Sept. 27, 2007  state party chairman Karen Thurman released a statement supportive of the move. “Florida Democrats absolutely must vote on Jan. 29," she wrote. "We make this election matter. Not the D.N.C., not the delegates, not the candidates, but Florida Democrats like you and me voting together."

Okay, so Clinton now demands that “the Democratic Party must count these votes... exactly as they were cast." Was that always her position?
Not at all. Clinton completely opposed recognizing Michigan and Florida until after the primaries--i.e., when she realized she might need their delegates to win the nomination. As  she said during an interview with New Hampshire Public Radio in October 2007, "it's clear that this election they're having [in Michigan] is not going to count for anything."

She wasn't alone, either. Two months earlier, Clinton adviser Harold Ickes actually voted to strip the rogue states of their delegates as a member of the DNC's Rules and Bylaws committee--"to prevent the gaming of the system," he said. Later than fall, Patti Solis Doyle, then Clinton's campaign manager, pledged not to compete in either contest--and was unequivocal as well. "We believe Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and South Carolina play a unique and special role in the nominating process... and the DNC's rules and its calendar provide the necessary structure to respect and honor that role," she said. "Thus, we will... adhere to the DNC-approved nominating calendar." And when Michigan's Levin pushed for an early vote in 2004, then-DNC chairman--and current Clinton aide--Terry McAuliffe put his foot down. "If I allow you to do that, the whole system collapses," McAuliffe said (at least according to his memoir)."The closest [Michigan's delegates will] get to Boston will be watching it on television. I will not let you break this entire nominating process for one state. The rules are the rules."

But when Clinton "won" Michigan on Jan. 15--and presumably caught a glimpse of the polling that showed her well ahead in Florida--she quickly changed her tune. "I believe our nominee will need the enthusiastic support of Democrats in these states to win the general election," she said on Jan. 25. "And so I will ask my Democratic convention delegates to support seating the delegations from Florida and Michigan." Ickes, Solis Doyle and McAuliffe immediately fell in line. Whether or not you think Clinton's change of heart was pure--it is tough to ignore more than two million votes in a contest this close--you can't say it wasn't a change of heart.*

What about Obama? What was his stance on Florida and Michigan? 
The Illinois senator has hardly been an apolitical angel in all of this, either. Like Clinton, he signed a pledge on Sept. 2, 2007 not to compete in Florida or Michigan. But he then went one step further. Joining Joe Biden, Bill Richardson, John Edwards and Dennis Kucinich, Obama chose on Oct. 9 to remove his name from Michigan's ballot. Though spun at the time as a show of respect for the DNC, Obama's decision to jump ship was as political as Clinton's decision to stay put: he wanted to a) appeal to Iowa voters, who were peeved that Michigan was suddenly competing for an early spot on the calendar and b) delegitimize a contest he was likely to lose. Mission accomplished. To his credit, though, Obama has been pretty consistent on the question of seating Florida and Michigan's delegates, repeating the mantra "Let's play by the DNC's rules" from last fall onward. It's just that he's held an unshakable lead in the pledged-delegate count since February--meaning that consistency was politically convenient, as well.

I have a great idea: revotes in Florida and Michigan!  Why the heck not?
Sorry, pal--that ship has sailed. In early March, there was a flurry of revote proposals flying back and forth between Florida, Michigan and Washington, D.C.: DNC-funded primaries, Florida-funded primaries, primaries funded by contributions to the state parties and vote-by-mail primaries with an early June deadline, among others. But none hit the mark. On March 17, Florida's Thurman announced that it was "logistically impossible" to conduct a state-run nominating event before June 10; on April 4, the Michigan state party followed suit.

For the record, this was another instance where Team Obama was at least as eager as Team Clinton to play politics with the process. As Clinton indignantly demanded that the party either "honor the results or hold new primary elections"--the latter being perhaps the best way to conform to DNC rules without dismissing the voters Florida and Michigan--Obama (and his surrogates) stalled and ultimately did little to help resolve the standoff. We'll work with the national party to find a solution, muttered the candidate. Meanwhile, his lawyers carped about every possible solution, saying they would be "unprecedented in conception and proposed structure" and noting that no other states had ever "re-run an election in circumstances like these." Dismissing the push for a revote movement as "more of a Clinton production," Obama campaign manager David Plouffe added that Florida's mail-in plan raised "real deep concerns" about reliability and security. "These are very complicated elections to put on," he said, helpfully.

In the end, it's not clear that Team Obama could've made revotes a reality; lack of money--not lack of candidate enthusiasm--eventually doomed the efforts in Florida and Michigan. That said, the hopemonger from Illinois wasn't exactly eager to let voters in those delinquent states have their belated say--especially seeing as they could've tipped the contest (which he was winning even then) in Clinton's direction. Ultimately, though, it was politics--not principle--that determined his position.

COMING UP IN PART II: What's Next for Florida and Michigan--and Clinton.

*Answer adapted from an earlier Stumper entry.